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A SERIOUS
ADDRESS
TO
SUCH OF THE PEOPLE CALLED
QUAKERS,
ON THE
CONTINENT OF NORTH-AMERICA,

AS PROFESS
SCRUPLES relative to the PRESENT GOVERNMENT:
EXHIBITING
The ancient real TESTIMONY of that PEOPLE, concerning
OBEDIENCE to CIVIL AUTHORITY.

WRITTEN

Before the Departure of the BRITISH ARMY from *Philadelphia*, 1778,

BY

A NATIVE OF *PENNSYLVANIA*.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,
FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL RATIONAL ENQUIRERS,

AN APPENDIX,

CONSISTING OF
EXTRACTS from an ESSAY concerning OBEDIENCE
to the SUPREME POWERS, and the DUTY of SUBJECTS in all
REVOLUTIONS, published in England soon after the Revo-
lution of 1688.

THE SECOND EDITION.

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THE EDITOR'S PREFACE.

GENTLE READER,

THE pains that hath been taken to suppress this little work, and smother it in its birth, will excite thy curiosity; and, let me assure thee, that the force of argument it contains, the weight of the authorities produced, and the candour with which it is written, will please thy understanding. The worthy Author is in full unity with Friends, a respectable Member of that Society, and well acquainted with the writings of those who are revered as orthodox amongst them. But as he has not thought fit to honour the first edition with his name, I shall not make so free as to prefix it to this second appearance of his work.

Why Friends should have been so anxious to suppress this candid Address, I cannot imagine; unless they feared to have their principles held up to public view, lest some should observe that their conduct, in the present great revolution, hath not been conformable thereto. Of this, however, thou wilt best judge after having perused the following sheets.



A serious ADDRESS to the People called
QUAKERS, on the Continent of *North-America*,
relative to the late great Revolution.

AS there are divers opinions in the Society, respecting the present Government, and doubts in the minds of some, whether it be right or proper to withdraw their obedience from preceding rulers and powers, and to submit to rulers and powers who are separated from, and set up in the stead and without the consent of the former: The right understanding and settling of this point appears to be the first necessary consideration. I would therefore, in the first place, observe and lay it down as an axiom, that, in cases of such magnitude as the present, there must certainly be something more than human, and that God Almighty, the Supreme Governor of the Universe, who is no respecter of persons, who doeth whatsoever he pleaseth with the powers of this world, setteth up and pulleth down whomsoever he pleaseth, and, for causes best known unto himself, hath allowed and permitted, and still doth allow and permit, changes and alterations in and of states and empires, to take place. It may not be amiss to call to mind the various mighty and well-known revolutions that he hath permitted at different times, not only amongst the people of Great-Britain, but most, if not all, the empires and people upon the face of the earth, to the subduing and setting aside one, and raising up another in the room thereof, from the times of Saul and David down to this very day; some of which, for the sake of the doubting, uninformed, or inconsiderate, I shall remark, as concisely as conveniently may be.

The kingdom of Saul, which was the first we read of in Holy Writ, although regularly and solemnly established, yet by degrees was weakened and reduced, and that of David by degrees raised over it; the introduction and rise of whose government we may see 1 Sam. 22, where we find that, on account of Saul's tyranny, David fled "and escaped to the cave of Adullam, and "when his brethren, and all his father's house heard it, they "went down thither to him, and every one that was in distress, "and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, and gathered themselves unto him, and he became

“ a Captain over them :” This was the beginning of David’s power, and these men, we learn, continued together with David until he was made King in Saul’s stead, which, though by the order and appointment of Providence, yet it may be observed that it was contrary to nature, as well as to the usual customs of all ages, since David not being heir to the crown, the claim thereto upon those principles belonging to the house of Saul, which I think, was notwithstanding declared should grow weaker and weaker, and that of David stronger and stronger.

And of Solomon, (David’s son and immediate successor) the Lord declared; “ Forasmuch as thou hast not kept my covenant “ and my statutes which I have commanded thee, I will surely “ *rend* the kingdom from thee, and will give it to *thy servant*. “ Notwithstanding in thy days, I will not do it, (for David “ thy father’s sake) but I will *rend* it out of the hand of thy son. “ Howbeit I will not *rend* away all the kingdom, but will give “ one tribe to thy son, (for David my servant’s sake; and for “ Jerusalem’s sake, which I have chosen.”) And in the next verse it is expressly declared, that “ *The Lord stirred up* an adversary unto Solomon, Hadad the Edomite.” And in the 23d verse it is again said, that “ *God stirred him up* another adversary, Rezon the son of Eliadah.” Which passages clearly manifest, that the hand of the Lord is in such events, and particularly the fulfilling of the foregoing prediction, which we find confirmed by the declaration of the Prophet to Jeroboam, as also by the exemplification of the rent garment; the Prophet telling him in the name of the Lord, “ I will take thee and thou “ shalt reign according to all that thy soul desireth, and shalt be “ King over Israel,” ver. 37.---which accordingly came to pass by the revolt of the ten tribes, as we may see in the 12th chap. upon the unjust, harsh and insolent answer, which Rehoboam gave to the petitions of the people.

Another instance of the dealings of the Lord with the kingdoms of men, we may see in the 16th chap. of I. Kings, where “ the word of the Lord came to Jehu, the son of Hanani, against Baasha (King of Israel) saying, forasmuch as I exalted thee out of the dust, and made thee Prince over my people Israel, and thou hast walked in the way of Jeroboam; behold, I will take away the POSTERITY of Baasha, and the POSTERITY of his house.”---And in the 9th of II. Kings, we find that the Prophet Elisha foretold the reign of Jehu, the son of Jehoshaphat (though a servant) in preference to his master, who had 70 sons, saying unto Jehu, by a messenger which he sent for that purpose, “ Thus saith the Lord God of “ Israel,

“ Israel, I have anointed thee King over the people of the Lord, even over Israel, and thou shalt smite the house of Ahab thy master,”---which was accordingly fulfilled, notwithstanding the contemptuous speech of the impudent woman Jezebel, who, upon his entering the city of Jezreel, cried out, “ Had Zimri peace who slew his master ?”---but she lived not long to repeat her folly :---Of this Jehu, although he slew his master and his 70 sons, by orders for that purpose, yet, according to the 30th ver. of 10th chap. the Lord said unto him, because thou hast done my will in executing that which is right in my eyes, and hast done unto the house of Ahab, according to all that was commanded thee, thy children of the fourth generation shall sit on the throne of Israel.

Our ancient friend *George Fox*, in an address to Kings and Rulers of all sorts, wherein he speaks of the Lord’s power and dealings, says, “ his hand is turned against Kings, and shall turn wise men backward, will bring their crowns to the dust, and lay them low and level with the earth.” Journ. p. 135. And the same friend, in a paper given forth in the year 1660, p. 309, says, “ All friends, concerning the changing of times and governments, let not that trouble any of you, for God hath a mighty work and hand therein.”---

Edward Burrough, in a piece called a representation to London, An. 1659, page 610 of his works, says, “ Now friends, do but truly consider, and with an humble mind, what the work of the Lord hath been in these nations, for divers years, and how he hath proceeded to overthrow and overturn powers and authorities, princes and rulers, and made them of no account before him ; and because of the oppression of Rulers among us, the nation hath groaned, and been left without a comforter from any man, and could not repose confidence in its Princes and Rulers, and this was that the nation might look unto the Lord, and that through him they might be saved, and expect healing from him alone ; and in all these overturnings, you need not fear but the hand of the Lord hath been in them, and his arm hath suffered and even brought these things to pass ; and therefore, why should you murmur against God, and be unsatisfied in what he hath done.”---The same author, page 672, speaking concerning the sufferings of King Charles, says,---“ As for the afflictions and sufferings sustained by him, so far as they were just and righteous judgments from God, because of iniquity, can no man be charged with, but that is on God’s account, who was pleased to chastise with afflictions and sufferings, and no man can be blamed with injustice, for that affliction which cometh from
“ the

“ the hand of God.” The public causes of Charles’s sufferings are well known, and who can say but the case is the same at this very time ; of which the very permission of the present opposition is a strong presumptive proof.

Francis Howgill, an ancient and eminent minister and author amongst us, in an address to the army, committee of safety, and parliament, p. 325 of his works, about the year -----, speaking of the end and intent of rule and authority, saith, ---“ For “ the thing intended being lost, the Ruler or Rulers rule no “ more for God, neither doth he account them such, whatever “ they may account themselves ; and therefore hath raised ano- “ ther thing to overthrow that power, as hath been evident in “ this nation, in these many revolutions, although that power “ which was first in being,” (no doubt meaning the King’s) “ which was ordained for the end aforesaid, might say to that “ which rose up against it, that it was *rebellion and treason*, and “ declare it to be such in the ears of the people, as hath been “ done by divers, which is in the memory of most ; so that I “ need not instance, when I say *it was not so accounted by the “ Lord*, and he hath given a testimony of this by the overthrow- “ ing of the former, and raising up the latter ;” and a little fur- “ ther, speaking of the form of government, says, “ Was not “ Israel governed sometime by Judges, sometime by Elders, and “ sometime by Kings ? and while they stood in the counsel of “ the Lord, the people hearkened to them, was not the Lord “ among them, and sometimes raised up *unlikely means*, as Da- “ vid a shepherd’s boy, and Gideon a threshier, and he was “ made a Judge and a Redeemer of Israel out of their slavery.” By which observations it appears, that Francis Howgill was a strong friend to public justice, and that he did not apprehend an attachment to any particular form of government merely as such, by any means essential or indispensable. The same author, page 326, further saith, “ Now many are so doting on the name of “ a parliament, as though it were essential, or the name to be “ the foundation of government, and cry up the privilege of “ parliament, as some have done prerogative, and would fight “ about a name in their heat and passion, and lose the thing in- “ tended, though they be the representative of the people, to do “ good to the people, and not hurt, they are accounted as good “ servants to God, and to them that elected them ; but if they “ would, so soon as got together, set up a particular interest to “ the *imbondaging* of the whole,” (as the parliament of Great Bri-
tain

tain towards this country “ *in all cases whatsoever*”) “ and then
 “ cry up their privilege to do what they list ; *then it is no rebellion*
 “ *on in God’s account*, neither in the account of just men, to call
 “ them away, when they do not perform the thing intended,
 “ and will not hearken to the cry of their masters (the people)
 “ but perhaps call them *rebels and traitors*, if they should be turn-
 “ ed out.” And page 329 of the same work, speaking of the
 conduct of the parliament, with regard to their obstruction of
 the liberties of the people, he saith, “ Therefore *the army* in
 “ putting a stop to that which did retard and draw back from
 “ the end aforesaid, in God’s sight and in the sight of illuminated
 “ men, is *no rebellion, no treachery.*”

The numerous changes and revolutions in the kingdoms and
 empires of the earth, clearly described and foretold by the pro-
 phets *Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Amos, and Zephaniah*, par-
 ticularly concerning the *Philistines, Ammonites, Edomites, Mo-
 abites, Damascus, Babylon, Jerusalem, Tyre, Sidon, Media, Per-
 sia, Græcia, Assyria, Ethiopia, &c.* as may be seen in holy writ,
 and which, for brevity sake, are not now repeated, fully prove the
 truth of the axiom laid down in the beginning ; and though that
 mode of communicating to mankind the will and purposes of
 God concerning the powers of this world, may be now almost
 ceased or at least suspended, yet the Creator of Heaven and Earth,
 who seeth from everlasting to everlasting, no doubt takes the same
 cognizance, and exercises the same superintending and executive
 power he did in days of old.

The pious and judicious *Rollin*, author of the ancient history,
 considering and remarking the great changes, which often take
 place in human affairs, and particularly the case of Nebuchad-
 nezzar, says, they “ shew the prodigious ease with which all the
 “ power and riches of a kingdom are carried away, when God
 “ appoints the revolution, and shift like a garment to a new
 “ owner.” Vol. I, p. 100. The same author, vol. 7, p. 340,
 speaking of the fall of Carthage, says, that “ Scipio, on that
 “ occasion, reflected that cities, nations and empires, are liable
 “ to revolutions no less than particular men,” and had the truth
 (observes Rollin) enlightened his soul, he would have discovered
 what we are taught in the Scriptures, that “ because of unright-
 “ teous dealings, injuries and riches got by deceit, a kingdom is
 “ translated from one people to another.” Ecc. 10, 8.---And
 p. 298 of the same vol. treating of the accomplishment of Daniel’s
 prophecies, relative to earthly kingdoms, says, “ What man
 “ but

“ but must adore that sovereign power, which God exercises in
 “ a secret manner, over Kings and Princes, whose very crimes
 “ he renders subservient to the execution of his sacred will, and
 “ the accomplishment of his eternal decrees; in which all events
 “ both general and particular, have their appointed time and
 “ place fixed beyond the possibility of failing, even those which
 “ depend most on the choice and liberty of mankind.” He fur-
 ther informs us, vol. 8, p. 298, that, on account of the arbitra-
 ry and unjust behaviour of *Antiochus*, (to whom part of Daniel’s
 prophecy related) the people revolted from him; and page 369,
 speaking of his successor *Seleucus*, whose fate appears to be pre-
 dicted by Daniel, chap. xi, v. 20, where the text says, “ then
 “ shall stand up in his (*Antiochus*) estate, a raiser of taxes, in
 “ the glory of his kingdom, but within few days he shall be de-
 “ stroyed; or, according to the Hebrew text, “ There shall
 “ arise up in his (*Antiochus*) place, a man, who, as an extortioner,
 “ a collector of taxes, shall cause to pass away, and shall destroy
 “ the glory of the kingdom;” which clearly point out the mi-
 serable effects, and just punishment, consequent of such arbitrary
 conduct. The foregoing author, at the conclusion of his history
 of the antients, p. 224, recounting the various kingdoms, states
 and empires of the world, their governments, customs, arts,
 sciences, grandeur, power, riches, &c. remarks thus, “ But
 “ whilst we are in admiration of so many shining accomplish-
 “ ments, the Supreme Judge, who can alone estimate all things,
 “ sees nothing in them but trifle, meanness, vanity and pride;
 “ and whilst mankind are continually busied in perpetuating the
 “ power of their families, in founding kingdoms, and eternizing
 “ themselves, (if that were possible) God from his throne on
 “ high overthrows all their projects, and makes even their am-
 “ bition the means of executing his operations and designs; all
 “ ages are present to him: He seeth from everlasting to everlast-
 “ ing. Ecc. 39, 19) He has assigned all empires their fate and du-
 “ ration. In the different revolutions, (which he had related)
 “ we have seen that nothing has come to pass by chance.”

Before I leave this part of the subject, it may not be amiss to
 insert some further observations of E. Burrough beforementioned,
 in answer to some queries proposed to the people called Quakers,
 by one of King Charles’s friends, supposed to have been the Earl
 of Clarendon; to which Edward Burrough replied thus, “ Yet
 “ notwithstanding I must still say, and it is my judgment, that
 “ there was very great oppression and vexation under the govern-

“ ment

“ ment of the late King, and Bishops under his power, which
 “ the Lord was offended with, and many good people oppressed
 “ by ; for which cause, the Lord might and *did justly raise up*
 “ *some to oppose*, and strive against oppressions and injustice, and
 “ to press after reformation in all things. This principle of sin-
 “ cerity, which in some things carried them on *in opposing* op-
 “ pressions, and pressing after reformation, *I can never deny*, but
 “ acknowledge it.” See Sewell’s hist. p. 283.

The foregoing precedents and observations one would think might be sufficient to satisfy the doubting, that the present revolution is the work of the Lord, and according to the plan and design of his providence, and tend to prove the safety and propriety of a submission to the powers which now rule : But it may be objected in justification of the present scruples and refusal by some, that the present powers and government are usurped and contrary to law : To this it may be answered, that the same objection would have held good under every revolution which has heretofore been brought about, as they must no doubt have been contrary to the authority of the preceding powers, and by their friends and adherents been deemed usurpations, which might also have been alledged against the present constitution of Great-Britain, as may be hereafter remarked.

It appears to me that it is for those who chuse not to have any hand in the formation of governments, to take governments such as they find them, and comply with their laws, so far as they are clear of infringing religious rights and matters of faith toward God : It cannot perhaps be found that friends, ever since they were a people, ever refused to assist in the support of government, but have ever held it right and necessary to comply with the laws of the various governments under which they lived ; for as, according to our own repeated declarations as a society, (see Sewell’s hist. p. 748, &c.) the “ setting up and putting down
 “ Kings and Governments is God’s peculiar prerogative, for
 “ causes best known to himself, and that it is not our work or
 “ business to have any hand or contrivance therein, nor to be
 “ busy bodies in matters above our stations.” Whether then can such a people, *by any means*, undertake to weaken or oppose the present government, seeing these things are allowed to belong only unto God, is a matter worthy of consideration : for though some may say that the King’s right is infringed, and that no other power than the King hath a right to this country and the government thereof, it may be alledged in return, that the King hath long since actually and expressly put the people of this country

out of his own protection, without distinction of persons, whether private or public, civil or religious: But I would seriously ask how any one knows, or can undertake to say, that the above assertion, on the part of the King, is really the case, and altogether right in the sight of God, who doth whatsoever he pleaseth in the kingdoms of this world. How know we, but as hath been the sentiment of divers living and powerful servants of the Lord, and members of society in these days, but that the Almighty, "for causes best known unto himself," may have a special hand in this work, as was generally agreed by friends that he had at the beginning, even in the apparently usurped revolution under Oliver Cromwell, as may be seen by the epistles of Francis Howgill, E. Burrough, and divers others written to him; which if it be the case, we possibly, and not without strong probability in the view of some, may "be found fighters against God," which is a most awful consideration, and ought strongly to operate in the minds of all; so that if they cannot actively *unite* with, they be very careful, by no means, to *oppose* the powers that now are, and which we are now under: unless they can say as a church, that it is clearly revealed unto them from God, that this government shall not stand, but come to nought, which I judge none will adventure to say: Let us then, I beseech of us, attend to the abovementioned profession and declaration, and see that if we are to have no hand in such matters, it may be uniform, if not on one side, neither on the other; for our declaration is that we have *no hand* "either in the setting up or pulling down," neither by this way or that way, as a religious society, there is no distinction made of what King or of what government, if not as to one, so neither as to another: if not by encouraging, so neither by discouraging.

As to the acknowledgment of submission and fidelity to the different governments we have lived under, the times or times in which such acknowledgments have been necessary, have been so distant, and so few, that there has not been much said on that head in the society; indeed the assenting practice of friends on these occasions, where no oath hath been required, has been so common and uncontended, that it has hitherto occasioned very little observation, and now one would think needed little or nothing said on the occasion: Nevertheless it is necessary to observe that George Fox, in a letter to Oliver Cromwell, during his protectorship, an. 1655, tells him, "many are cast into prison, and made
" a prey upon, because they cannot take the oath of abjuration,
" *though they denied all that is* **ABJURED** *in it*; and by that means
" many

“ many of the messengers and ministers of the Lord Jesus Christ
 “ are cast into prison.”--- Jour. p. 152. From which it appears
 clearly, that the refusal, even of the ministers in society, at that
 time, and under that revolution, which was built not only upon
 the opposition but banishment and destruction of a king, arose
 from no other scruple than merely because it was administered
 in the form of an oath, which otherwise, as appears by this let-
 ter, they would readily have taken, although it was not simply a
 declaration of fidelity, but an abjuration; that is to say, a re-
 nouncing of all opposite powers, claims and pretensions: indeed
 the common and frequent answer of friends, when they were
 questioned or persecuted for not taking the oaths of allegiance
 and supremacy, was, “ we cannot take an oath, if we could take
 “ any oath, we could take this.”--- Now if George Fox and the
 friends of that day could have safely and freely given a declara-
 tion of fidelity to Oliver Cromwell, as well as a renunciation of
 all other temporal authority, what hinders that the same may be
 done now?---

At the revolution which happened under king William, upon
 James's being obliged to quit the kingdom, it appears by Sewell's
 history, p. 705, that the parliament, in compliance with the
 people called Quakers, framed and enacted a Test, which, tho'
 of a very strict and binding nature, W. Sewell speaks of with great
 satisfaction, notwithstanding it was to be performed to a person,
 who, (tho' worthy of the trust reposed in him) yet, by hereditary
 right, had no claim to the crown.

The Test is as follows: “ I A. B. do sincerely promise, and
 “ solemnly declare before God and the world, that I will be true
 “ and faithful to King William and Queen Mary; and I do
 “ solemnly profess and declare, that I do from my heart abhor,
 “ detest and renounce, as impious and heretical, that damnable
 “ doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated, or de-
 “ prived by the Pope, or any authority of the See of Rome, may
 “ be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatso-
 “ ever. And I declare, that no foreign Prince, Person, Prelate, State
 “ or Potentate, hath, or ought to have, any power, jurisdiction,
 “ superiority, pre-eminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritu-
 “ al, within this realm.” This was the Test made for and ac-
 cepted by the Society, altho' expressly for seclusion of the natural
 lawful heir, who, at the very same time, maintained a court, and
 was encouraged and supported by one of the most powerful States
 in Europe; a Prince who had rendered the Society many signal
 services and favours, and who, it is remarked, had received more

addresses from the people he governed, than perhaps any other King in the same space of time; particularly from the London friends, who, but about two years before this act of abjuration or renunciation, told him, "It should be their endeavour (with God's help) ALWAYS to approve ourselves the King's faithful and loving subjects,---praying God to bless him, his royal family and people, with grace and peace, and that after *a long* and prosperous reign here, he might receive a better crown among the blessed." See the address in Sewell's hist. p. 683.--- Also the whole body of friends, in and from the yearly meeting of London, 1687, in the conclusion of an address, tell him that "*while we live*, it shall be our endeavour (thro' God's grace) to demean ourselves, as in conscience to God, *and duty* to the King, *we are obliged*, his peaceable, loving and *faithful* subjects."

Several other instances might be adduced on this occasion, but it is apprehended that these may be sufficient to shew, that, notwithstanding preceding obligations, attachments and declarations, the society have not apprehended themselves implicitly and unexceptionably bound to any King or Power, further than they governed according to the fundamental principles of the empire; but that they were dissolved from their promises and declarations, when the Prince manifestly and actually attempted to subvert the principles of the constitution; otherwise how can we reconcile the solemn declaration and promises made to King James, with the promises and declarations made to King William, and those who succeeded.

Now seeing this has been the real and declared sentiment and conduct of society on former occasions, would it not be hard for them to censure or condemn those who apprehend themselves excusable for conforming or submitting to the present powers, which, according to Scripture, must be allowed "to be of God." This appears to some to be going a great length; but let us consider that if we examine the conduct and characters of former Rulers and Governors, particularly those concerning whom the Apostle makes that solemn acknowledgment, we shall have reason to believe that they were not more likely to be ordained of God, than the powers which are now set over us, seeing they were superstitious and warlike Heathens, immersed in gross idolatry: --- But it may be objected the proceedings against King James, and the subsequent conformity of friends and others to the succeeding powers, was chiefly upon a religious account and principle, which he evidently attempted unlawfully to infringe: This is granted; but are not all laws and obligations between men condi-
tional

tional, and no longer binding than the terms, upon which they were made, are kept and observed, agreeable to that well known maxim adopted by Wm. Penn in his famous trial,---“*Cessante ratione legis, cessat Lex.*”--- That is, The reason of the Law ceasing, the Law itself ceaseth: This must have been the principle upon which they acted; and shall those be now censured for acting as to civil affairs, what the society itself did as to religious concerns? Are not promises and obligations made equally valid in both, and the breakers of the one criminal (in such cases) as well as the other?

Without entering far into a political disquisition of the merits of the cause now in agitation, I would just refer to consideration the glaring, undeniable and repeated strokes given to, and breaches made in the constitution under which we have heretofore lived, by those who were bound and sworn to maintain it inviolably, even at the risque of their eternal salvation, as may be gathered from W. Penn's works, vol. 1. p. 685, &c. where, amongst other things, he recites the sentence pronounced against the breakers of the articles in the Great Charter, which is as follows: “In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, Amen. Whereas our Sovereign Lord the King, to the honour of God and of Holy Church, and for the common profit of the realm, hath granted for him, and his heirs for ever, these articles above written. Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of all England, admonished all his province, once, twice and thrice, because that shortness will not suffer so much delay, as to give knowledge to all the people of England of these presents in writing: We therefore enjoin all persons, *of what estate soever they be*, that they, and every of them, as much as in them is, shall uphold and maintain these articles granted by our Sovereign Lord the King, *in all points*: And all those *that in any point do resist or break*, or in any manner hereafter procure, counsel, or in any wise assent to resist or break those ordinances, or go about it, by word or deed, openly or privily, by any manner of pretence or colour, We, the aforesaid Archbishops, by our authority in this writing expressed, do excommunicate and accurse, and from the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, and from all the company of heaven, and from all the sacraments of holy Church do sequester and exclude.”

Upon which W. Penn observes, “We may here see, that in the obscurest times of popery, they were not without a sense of justice and a care of *freedom*, and that even papists, whom
“*many*

“ many think no friends to *liberty* and *property*, under dreadful penalties, enjoin an *inviolable* observance of this Great Charter, by which they are confirmed. And though I am no Roman Catholic, and as little value their other curses pronounced upon religious dissenters, yet I declare ingenuously I would not, for the world, incur this curse, *as every man* DESERVEDLY DOTH, *that offers violence to the fundamental freedoms thereby repeated and confirmed.*”

Now if Kings, as well as others, deserved the penalties here mentioned, for a breach of that charter, then the mere renunciation or refusal of their right to a small spot of this earth, must certainly be considered in the mildest point of view. Plutarch (in Pyrrh. p. 390) says that “ Kings, when any revolution happens in their dominions, are apt to complain bitterly of their subjects unfaithfulness and disloyalty ; but they do them wrong, and forget that it was themselves, who gave them the first lessons of their disloyalty, by disregarding justice and fidelity, which they sacrificed to their own particular interests.”

The judicious Rollin, author of the ancient history, vol. 2, p. 288, after treating of the cause of the declension in the Assyrian empire, says, “ Surely the oaths by which Treaties were sealed and ratified, and the Deity brought in not only as present but as guarantee of the conditions stipulated, (as was the case between the Kings of Great-Britain and their subjects) is a most sacred and august ceremony, very proper for the subjecting of earthly Princes to the Supreme Judge of Heaven and Earth. Now if Princes, by their unfaithfulness, will teach their people not to stand in fear of the Supreme Being, how shall they be able to secure respect and reverence to themselves ? Nor is it at all astonishing, that the contempt which an impious Prince, who has no regard to the sanctity of an oath, shews of God and religion, should shake the very foundations of the firmest and best established empires, and sooner or later occasion their utter destruction.” And page 275, the same author says, that “ among other causes which brought the ruin of that empire, the four following may be looked upon as the principal : Their excessive magnificence and luxury, the abject subjection and slavery of the people, the bad education of their Princes, and their want of faith in the execution of their Treaties, Oaths and Engagements.”

As to the renunciation of the King's heirs and successors, which seems to be a material cause of objection with some, do we not find that when any person or persons forfeit their estates to the King or country where they dwell, that their heirs and successors

fors are also deprived of the same ; indeed nothing can be claimed by an heir, as such, but in virtue or right of his ancestor or progenitor ; and if there be no right in them, or the right, if any, were forfeited or lost, it is also lost to their heirs and successors ; for though right not forfeited or alienated does not die, though it may sleep, yet right once forfeited or properly lost, can never properly be regained : Beside the King (as hath been observed) has already put the people of this country, without distinction, out of his protection, by express declaration ; and as protection and allegiance being reciprocal, is an established maxim in all states, and is according to the nature and reason of things : Upon this principle, by the King's own act, the allegiance of the people is dissolved. The same may be said with regard to these States, if, by the will of Providence, they should hereafter be subdued, and no longer capable of yielding protection ; which is according to the declaration of Congress, as well as to the preamble of the act for securing the present government, which expressly declares that protection and allegiance are reciprocal : This is the object and ultimatum of the act, and is the natural, simple and true construction of the same, being, without doubt, no other than what must be intended and expected at the framing of the same, as is allowed by the judgment of those now in power, nor can it indeed be otherways rightly understood.

Having said thus much as to declarations of fidelity and renunciation, it may not be amiss to add something on the subject of the payment of Taxes.

For this purpose I shall produce an epistle of George Fox, taken from his book of epistles, p. 137, where he advises, "*All friends every where, who are dead to all carnal weapons, and have beaten them to pieces, stand in that which takes away the occasion of wars, which saves mens lives, and destroys none, nor would have others ; and as for the Rulers that are to keep peace, for peace sake, and for the advantage of truth, give them their tribute ; but to bear and carry weapons to fight with, the men of peace, (who live in that which takes away the occasion of wars) they cannot act in such things, under the several powers, but have paid their tribute, which they may do still for peace sake, and not hold back the earth, but go over it, and in so doing friends may better claim their liberty.*"

W. Penn, in an address to the high court of parliament, anno 1671, vol. 1, p. 41, tells them, that " We both own and are ready to yield obedience to every ordinance of man, re-

" *lating*

“ *lating to human affairs*, and that for conscience sake ; and that
 “ IN ALL REVOLUTIONS, we have demeaned ourselves with
 “ much peace and patience, disowning all contrary actings ; and
 “ that we have lived *most peaceably* under all the various govern-
 “ ments that have been since our first appearance ;” which could
 not have been said with propriety, unless they had submitted to the
 civil ordinances of men, as above declared.

Thomas Story, in his journal, p. 269, speaking concerning a
 law made to enforce the bearing of arms, which he disapproved,
 yet in the course of the debate, which he had with the judge of a
 court, saith, “ I began with the example of Christ himself
 “ for the payment of a Tax, though applied by Cæsar *unto the*
 “ *uses of war*, and other exigencies of his government ;” and
 was going to shew the difference between a law that directly and
 principally affects the person in war, *requiring personal service*,
 and a law which only requires a *general tax*, to be applied by Ru-
 lers as they see cause ; “ for though *we as a people readily pay such*
 “ *taxes* impartially assessed, yet as the kingdom of Christ is not
 “ of this world, his servants will not fight, though they may and
 “ ought to pay taxes, according to the example of Christ their
 “ head :” And what that instance and example was, he relates
 p. 410, where he says, that “ The Lord Jesus Christ obeyed all
 “ the righteous laws both of *Jews and Romans*, so far as his con-
 “ dition in this world subjected him to them : For though he was,
 “ and is the peaceable Saviour, and came not to destroy mens
 “ lives, but to save them, yet in obedience to the laws of men,
 “ where not opposite to or interfering with the laws of God, he
 “ wrought a miracle to pay a poll-tax, where in strictness the
 “ law did not require it of him, nor of his disciples ; for having
 “ Roman privileges by virtue of an old league between the Jews
 “ and Romans, whereby they were as children and not strangers,
 “ nevertheless to obviate all occasion of offence, he submitted
 “ to it, though only an ordinance of men, and his apostles like-
 “ wise, *as an example to his church through all ages then to come.*”

Though this example is generally well known, it may not be
 improper here to recite it, which was thus : “ And when they
 came to Capernaum, they that received Tribute-money, came
 to Peter, and said, doth your master pay Tribute ? He saith yes.
 And when he was come into the house, Jesus prevented him, say-
 ing, what thinkest thou, Simon ? Of whom do the Kings of the
 earth take Custom or Tribute ; of their own children or of stran-
 gers ? Peter saith unto him, of strangers. Jesus saith unto him,
 then are the children free. Notwithstanding, lest we should of-
 fend

send them, go thou to the sea, and cast an hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up, and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a piece of money : That take, and give unto them for me and thee." Matt. 17th, v. 24, 25, 26, 27.

It is here remarkable that our Saviour appears to have revolved in his mind the whole nature of the case, and of the demand that was made ; for upon Peter's informing the Tax-gatherers, that his master paid Tribute, our Lord took occasion to remind him by a gentle reprehension, that he had gone further in his reply than he was bound to do, or than was requisite from the nature of their condition and circumstances ; and immediately upon Peter's entering the house, prevented his speaking by making use of a very strong and lively argument to convince Peter, that he had been quite as quick as was necessary ; and that instead of being bound to pay the Tax, they were, according to the custom of the country, exempt and free ; yet notwithstanding this freedom and privilege, or without the least objection to the use to which the money might be applied, though the Romans were in general Heathen idolaters, and about that time, as appears from history, actually engaged in war on several sides, and the character of their Emperor *Tiberius* marked as debauched, unjust, cruel, tyrannic, sanguinary and inhuman. Yet Christ our Lord, though clothed with majesty and power above all the laws and powers of this world, and was thereby able to have subdued all things unto himself, and made them subservient to his will, was so tender of giving uneasiness to the powers that then bore rule, that he ordered Peter, by producing an astonishing miracle, as we have read, to comply and pay the Tax for this very striking reason, "*lest we should offend.*"

Thomas Story beforementioned, in his journal, page 413, saith, " That the sufferings of the faithful in Christ, *in all ages*, have not arose from the breach of *any laws* relating only to civil government, which they do readily observe and conscientiously obey," And in the same page adds, " That as there always is and must be, in the nature of things, a great and necessary charge attending government, (a kingdom or *state* being but as one great house or family, and no private or particular family can subsist without charge) for that cause, all are to pay Tribute, as justly (or equally) imposed by the legislature."

The said author, in a conference had with the *Czar of Muscovy*, saith, " Though we are prohibited arms and fighting in person, as inconsistent (we think) with the rules of the gospel of Jesus Christ ; yet we can, and do, by his example, readily and
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cheerfully pay unto every government, and in every form, where we happen to be subjects, such sums and assessments as are required of us by the *respective* laws under which we live. For when a general Tax was laid by the *Roman* Czar, upon his extensive empire, and the time of payment came, the *Lord Jesus Christ* (according to Scripture, Mat. 25, as recited by T. Story) "wrought a miracle to pay a Tax, where yet it was not strictly due; we, by so great an example, do freely pay our Taxes to Cæsar, who of right hath the direction and application of them, to the various ends of government, to peace or to war, as it pleaseth him, or as need may, according to the constitution or laws of his kingdom." Jour. p. 125.

W. Penn, vol. 2. p. 33, saith, "That since we are as large contributors to the government as our antagonists, we are intitled to as large protection from it." Now this saying could not have been true, unless they paid all the public Taxes, in common with other men, which no doubt their antagonists did; and by analogous conclusion, if we, under the present dispensation, refuse to contribute to the government under which we live, how can we expect to be intitled to its protection, not only at present, but in case the Almighty should see meet further and fully to establish it.

The said Author, in the same vol. p. 788, in answer to some objections made against the society, observes among other things, that it was said "The Quakers will not support civil government," &c. To which he answers, "This is also untrue upon experience; for what people, (says he) under government, pay their taxes better than they do."

Samuel Bownas, in the account of his life, relates an epistolary argument he had with one *Ray*, a Priest, who charged friends with an inconsistency in that, while they actually paid and even collected Tax for the purposes of carrying on a war against France with vigour: They yet refused to pay Tythes and Militia assessments. To which S. Bownas replies, "We are still of the same mind with R. Barclay, that wars and fightings are inconsistent with the gospel principles, and still lie under sufferings with respect to the militia, being careful to walk by the rule of Christ's doctrine; and yet do not think ourselves inconsistent in actively complying with the law of Taxes, in rendering unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and he may do therewith what pleaseth him." Where it may be well to observe, that he there speaks of Taxes as due unto Cæsar; thereby no doubt meaning the power that for the present bears rule, whether Emperor, Protector, King, or Congress.

From

From what has been observed, I think it may plainly appear, that friends heretofore have been so far from censuring or condemning their members on such occasions, that they have rather encouraged the Payment of Taxes, (except those in lieu of personal service) and advised a submission to the powers that bore rule, under the various governments and revolutions in which they lived; but if this be doubted, or any thing has been advanced that is not conformable to the truth, it will be well for any one to point out the same; but if they are consistent with reason, justice and truth, it will be well to be cautious how any thing is acted opposite thereto; and whilst we declare that we cannot have a hand in public revolutions, (as belonging unto God) by promoting and encouraging, we may beware of taking an active part by opposing and discouraging, whether as to Non-payment of Taxes, or other civil acts; and then of consequence none can, with propriety or consistency, be censured or condemned concerning the same, especially in cases where no precedent for censure or condemnation can be found in the history or proceedings of friends.

As it is queried by some, whether Friends paid their Taxes under the government of *Oliver Cromwell*, although there is as great or greater reason to conclude they did, than there is to suppose or prove that they did not; yet it may be observed that the practice of friends, ever since the time of George Fox, has been to keep a particular account of the sufferings they sustained, and the amount thereof, when it was on a conscientious or religious account, which have been recorded, and transmitted down to us from time to time: Now as it never yet has appeared in the accounts of friends sufferings, that any thing was taken from them, on account of Taxes, even under *Cromwell's* government, the committee of safety, or any of the then powers, which, if on a religious account, they had refused to pay, would have amounted to a very considerable sum, equal, if not superior, to any recorded by them, and would no doubt have been taken particular notice of amongst their other sufferings; but as nothing of this kind appears, it is therefore *more than probable*, and may be very safely concluded, that they submitted in these respects to the several governments, of what kind soever, under which they lived; and that they paid their Taxes for the support of those governments, in common with other men, according to their uniform practice as a people.

To the above Testimony of the dead, let us attend also to one of the living, an anonymous author, though well known to be Timothy Davis, a worthy friend and minister of the gospel; in a letter to some of his intimate friends on the subject of paying Taxes

to the present government, printed at Watertown, about two years ago, and sold by B. Edes, near the Bridge, has fully declared his sentiments in the following manner :

“ If it be safe to follow the example of our predecessors, why not comply ?---“ What did they do ? ”---I answer, they have from their very first appearance, as a separate society, been subject to such who were invested with the authority of the nation, without meddling with the various disputes that have arisen since their time, concerning regal authority, and on whom it ought to devolve. For a farther consideration hereof, you may remember, that friends made their appearance in the reign of King Charles the First ; who, by his too much aspiring after sovereignty or despotism, alarmed the people, who, headed by Oliver Cromwell, prevailed against the king, and took the reins of government into his own hands, and governed the kingdom himself, under the character of Lord Protector.

Here we do not find but that friends, who had paid their allegiance and their taxes to the king, continued to pay them to Oliver Cromwell, during the time he held the reins of government : And what can be said of him, but that he headed the populace, and was an opposer of kingly authority, not merely as such, but as it became, through the hands of the king, subversive of the rights and privileges of the people : What harder things can be said of those who are at the head of the present opposition, that may render them less worthy of receiving taxes to defray the charges of government. By all that I have been able to discover our society in England have ever made a point of being careful and exact in paying all taxes that are legally assessed, except the Priests rates.

After *Cromwell*, king Charles the Second came to the throne, and they paid taxes to him also. After which, the crown continued in the family of Stewarts, until the disturbances in king James the Second's reign ; who, by his favouring popery, justly alarmed and incens'd the people against him, that thinking himself not safe among a justly provoked people, took shelter in France, which made way for the Prince of Orange. Here we find the line of Stewarts interrupted again, which devolved on them according to legal succession, and the Prince, in conjunction with the people, opposing the then kingly government in James ; much the same as is laid to the charge of those who are at the head of the present opposition ; and Friends, who were desirous to live in peace with all men, paid taxes to him likewise ; but say they, “ James favoured popery, and endeavoured to introduce popish government, and therefore forfeited his right to the crown.” Be it so---but is favouring popery the only

only instance in which the kings of England can forfeit their rights to reign over a free people?---I should think, that when the sword is put into the hands of a king, to be directed *for the punishment of evil doers, and praise to them that do well*, we might have some reason to expect him to act, in some measure, answerable to his exalted station, and the trust the people have reposed in him, (as kingly authority originates from the people)---But if to the contrary he should act so far below his exalted station, as to turn the point of the sword at the vitals of the people, it must be very alarming, especially when they have confer'd all the favours upon him, that were in their power, consistent with the safety of the kingdom, he as fully forfeits his right to reign over them, as in the case of popery.

Every considerate man, no doubt would be glad of such a form of government as might be unexceptionable; but we have no reason to expect it, in this imperfect state of things: Yet we ought to use all just and reasonable means to rectify all disorders in government, that are in the compass of our power, consistent with the peaceable profession we make; and at the same time to be as careful not to complain without just cause, but be as content as we can, under such a form of government, as it hath pleas'd Divine Providence to cast our lots: And it must be a very bad one indeed, that is not preferable to a state of anarchy. In a word, let a man be under any form of government he can imagine to himself, where he receives any advantage by it, and while he remains under it, he ought to bear his proportion of the charge of it; for the thoughts of having our lives and every thing that is near and dear to us, lie wholly at the mercy of every invader, without any possibility of redress from any legal authority, I should think, would incline us to be willing to bear our just proportion of the charge of such government as we are under, if it should not in every respect be consistent with the most perfect system.

Our Saviour hath set this matter in an indisputable light to me, by the conversation he had with Peter on that subject, at a time when those who received tribute-money came to Peter querying with him, whether their *Master paid Tribute* or not? *Peter said* he did. Christ willing, it appears, to take advantage of this opportunity, to leave an example to future ages of his approbation of paying taxes, in a case similar to the present, in every thing essential to the present argument, and as an additional weight to the holy example, introduc'd a conversation with Peter, not waiting for him to introduce it, or propound any questions on the subject, but *prevented him*, as if with design to remove every hesitation, proceeded thus, *What thinkest thou, Simon, of whom do the kings of earth take custom or tribute, of their own children or of strangers?* *Peter saith unto him, of strangers.*

Jesus

Jesus saith unto him, Then are the children free. As much as if he had said, “then have they no just demand on us, we being children, may very well refuse paying of it---Nevertheless, lest we should offend them, it is best it should be paid, therefore I would have thee do it,” which he was enabled to do by an extraordinary miracle. I cannot see how it is possible for any thing to be express’d more clearly to remove every scruple. It is further observable, that there is not one word of objection either from Christ or Peter, that part of this tribute-money went to defray military charges, (for it undoubtedly did) which we might expect to find here if any where, seeing they were then upon the point of paying taxes.

If our rulers pursue measures for the defence and support of civil government, that we think not strictly consistent with the rules of the gospel, even by repelling force by force, to the shedding of human blood, it is out of our power to help it; they proceed in the defence of government as it suits them best; and if their manner doth not suit us, that may not hinder, but we may receive as much advantage from it as if they pursued such measures as we may think we could point out. However, let them proceed in a hostile manner or not, in the defence of our rights and privileges, it is certain, if we receive advantage from civil government, we ought to bear our part of the charge of maintaining of it, or else have no recourse to it in any case whatever; for it would be very odd for us to seek protection against the encroachments or abuse of our fellow creatures, from an authority that we refuse to help to support. It may farther be observed, that the tribute that Peter paid by our Saviour’s direction, was at a time when the Jews were under the Romans, and Cæsar at great expence in supporting his legions for the defence of his empire: That as Christ, by the hand of Peter, paid a tax, He must consequently pay a proportionable part of such charge.

In one place Christ saith, *Render to Cæsar the things that are his*; but in the instance before us, he sets us an example of paying the requisition of civil authority, not only when the soldiers received a part of it, but even where not strictly due, rather than give offence; although it helped to uphold a government under which they (*i. e.* the Jews) were reduced by the dint of sword; an example of meekness that ought to have place in every considerate mind; that whilst we remain steady to our testimony against shedding human blood, we may preserve our consciences void of offence toward God and man, and by no means, at any time, throw out any unbecoming reflections against those in authority, nor mistake will for tender scruple of conscience in paying taxes,

or

or in any thing else, nor give civil authority any unnecessary trouble.

The matter now under consideration is serious. Many valuable members of society, both public and private, at this time, in different places, do not think themselves called or bound to join in the refusals and scruples which some make, and many more who have not yet fully considered the matter, will probably be of the same mind; if this be allowed, which I believe may safely be done, will it not be exceeding hard that they should be denied the privileges of that society, in whose ways they have been educated, and whose religious principles they profess and hold, and to which they are closely attached? In time past, though there was diversity of sentiments with regard to some matters, yet we bore one with another without censure, in that spirit of condescension and brotherly regard, which is peculiarly characteristic of the followers of the Lamb, and shall we now, in very similar cases, give up that Christian temper, cast one another off, and produce a separation, when love and union might be preserved as well as in former days, and for which there is probably as much occasion as ever there was since the foundation of the province.

If indeed we think it proper as a society, to maintain an opposition to the present powers of government, in civil as well as religious respects, it may preclude the use of the present observations, or at least render any service, which might be expected from them, very improbable; but as that would appear to be so contrary to the profession we have made, as well as inconsistent with our established principles, that I presume it cannot really be the case: I have therefore taken the freedom of laying these observations before us for our serious consideration.

Never was there a people more deeply interested in the event of public proceedings, than we now are. We are considerably numerous in various parts of the continent, and particularly so in this State. We are not only interested ourselves, but future generations may likewise be deeply affected by the part we now act. I wish us therefore so to conduct, as that Jew nor Gentile, or the church of Christ, either at this or any future time, may have just occasion of offence.

Now, notwithstanding what has been offered, as there may be some who may allege that their scruples and non-compliance with the demands of the present government, as to civil affairs, arises from a principle of conscience, which I am sensible is a very delicate point to touch upon, yet as I have no other end in view, but the good of society, as well as individuals, I would
therefore

therefore beg them to consider that conscience, according to the general idea annexed to it, is a very sacred thing. Let us therefore be cautious how we apply it to common, civil, and merely human affairs, lest we make the plea for it upon more important occasions of too light estimation : It is deeply expedient for us to consider its nature, or what we are to understand thereby in religious affairs, and what are the proper and fit objects and subjects thereof, which may be necessary to claim and assert as independent of the power of the civil magistrate : For this purpose let us observe Rob. Barclay's sentiment of the matter, who, in the latter part of the 5th and 6th proposition, after speaking of the light of Christ, and the light of man's natural conscience, saith, " To the light of Christ then in the conscience, and not to man's natural conscience, it is that we commend men : This, not that, it is, which we preach up and direct people to, as to a most certain guide unto eternal life." From hence we may safely infer, that no objection arising from any thing short of the light of Christ, can be sufficient to operate with the professors of Christ our Lord, as a Christian church, in their proceedings and determinations ; so that it essentially behoves them, certainly to know that it is altogether from the illumination and power thereof, and not at all from the other, that they are actuated : This appears to be absolutely and indispensably necessary for the right and true support of a pure Christian testimony, and which I heartily wish may be deeply and sufficiently attended to by all the active members of society ; for in vain is it to endeavour to lift up a standard to the nations, unless in and by that power alone which is able to strengthen for the work ; without which pure and unmixed qualification it will prove too large and too heavy, so that being beaten and driven by the winds, it will fall to the ground, to the shame and confusion of those who attempted to erect and support it.

The said author, in the 14th proposition of the apology, treating of the power of the civil magistrate, saith, " The question is first, whether the civil magistrate hath power to force men *in things religious*, to do contrary to their consciences, and if they will not, to punish them in their goods, liberties and lives ? This (saith he) we hold in the negative. But secondly, as we would have the magistrate to avoid this extreme of encroaching upon mens consciences ; so, on the other hand, we are far from joining with or strengthening such libertines, as would stretch the liberty of their consciences to the prejudice of their neighbours, or the ruin of human society. We understand therefore *by matters of conscience*, such as immediately relate betwixt God and man, or
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men and men, as to meet together to worship God in that way which they judge is most acceptable unto him ; and not to inroach upon or seek to force their neighbours, otherwise than by reason, or such other means as Christ and his apostles used, viz. preaching, and instructing such as will hear and receive it ; *but not at all* for men *under the notion* of conscience, to do any thing contrary to the moral and perpetual statutes *generally* acknowledged by all Christians ; in which case the magistrate may very lawfully use his authority." The doctrine here preached is excellent both for those in, as well as those under authority, as it may clearly appear from thence that "*in things religious,*" such as he there mentions, he apprehends the magistrate has no just power, and that conscience may safely be pleaded ; but observe the care and caution with which he writes, and how positively he excludes from that sacred claim " any thing that is acted contrary to the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by all Christians." But it may be asked, what are those moral and perpetual statutes ? I at once take it for granted, that the laying and paying of Taxes for the support of human and civil governments, and acknowledging the authority of the same, are material parts ; seeing they have been very generally assented and submitted unto by Christians of all sects and denominations, at and from the personal appearance of our Lord Jesus Christ, in all countries, and under all revolutions, down to this very day ; and without which " human society" could not be supported, but inevitably verge into confusion and ruin : From which I would as concisely as possible, according to the worthy author's manner, and nearly in his own words, lay down a position, and then draw and prove what I apprehend to be an undeniable and conclusive argument, as follows :

Pos. That it is unlawful and improper to counteract the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by Christians.

But the laying and paying of Taxes for the support of human and civil governments, and acknowledging the authority of the same, are of those moral and perpetual statutes, &c.

Therefore it is unlawful and improper to counteract them.

If the cause of refusal and non compliance were a matter of mere faith and conscience toward God, the case would be exceedingly different, and there would probably be no dissent ; but as it appears to be only of civil concern, and relates solely to human affairs, it is therefore apprehended not censurable by the church, or properly cognizable thereby : And here I cannot but remark one reason why I believe many among us are led into a mistake, and scruples arise against paying of Taxes for want of a well in-

formed judgment. It is a received opinion among us, that all wars without distinction are sinful : Hence arises this scruple against paying of Taxes for the support of war ; but this is not the genuine doctrine of our ancient friends, as will fully appear in the following extract from the writings of Isaac Pennington, where speaking to what he very properly styles “ a weighty question concerning the magistrates protection of the innocent.” It is to be observed, that this enlightened author views magistracy and defensive war, as the same thing, or, if I may use a simile as one building (though consisting of divers parts) standing on the same foundation. The question is as follows : Vol. 1st, p. 444. “ Whether the magistrate, in righteousness and equity, is engaged to defend such, who (by the peaceableness and love which God hath wrought in their spirits, and by that law of life, mercy, good-will, and forgiveness, which God, by his own finger, hath written in their hearts) are taken off from fighting, and cannot use a weapon destructive to any creature.”

Answer : “ Magistracy was intended by God for the defence of the people ; not only of those who have ability, and can fight for them, but of such also who cannot, or are forbidden by the love and law of God, written in their hearts so to do. Thus women, children, sick persons, aged persons, and also priests in nations (who have ability to fight, but are exempted by their function, which is not equivalent to the exemption which God makes by the law of his spirit in the heart) have the benefit of the law, and of the magistrates protection, without fighting for the defence of either.”

Now if magistracy be appointed by God, and if it be magistrates duty to defend such, who are either not able, or cannot for conscience sake defend themselves ; is it possible any can be right who lay waste this ordinance, or speak of such defence as sinful ? If any man be appointed by God to defend my life, is it possible that God can authorise me to call him a sinner for doing his duty ? or is it possible that I can, consistent with my duty, refuse him that tribute which is absolutely necessary to enable him thus to defend me ? But had I much greater abilities to speak to this subject than I am conscious of, no reasoning of mine could be of equal authority with the author above quoted. Hear him therefore again, p. 448, where, treating on this peaceable principle professed by the society, he says, “ I speak not this against any magistrates or peoples defending themselves against foreign invasions, or making use of the sword to suppress the violent and evil-doers within their own borders ; *for this the present state of things may and doth require,* and

and a great blessing will attend the sword, when it is uprightly borne to that end, and its use will be *honourable*; and while there is need of a sword, the Lord will not suffer that government, or those governors, to want fitting instruments under them for the management thereof, who wait on him in his fear to have the edge of it rightly directed; but yet there is a better state which the Lord hath already brought some into, and which nations are to expect and travel towards."

A candid and judicious author, to wit, Richard Finch, in a Treatise called Second Thoughts concerning War, see page 95, after the above quotation, further adds, "It is evident that this great man holds forth plainly the divine œconomy I have hinted at above. We see it was his judgment that men using the sword; in this gospel day, may be God's instruments; and that herein, though not come to the better state or summit of Christian perfection, they may yet be good enough to use or direct the sword to be used religiously in God's fear: When perhaps many would think that religion in all, instead of using the sword, would if regarded, lead directly from the use of it; but it seems this writer, though a great advocate for our doctrine, thought otherwise; and I profess myself to be his profelyte, though at present, if there are a few persons so pious, I should almost as soon expect to find the philosophers stone, as an whole army of such warriors: And I am persuaded a due regard to what may be urged upon his and my principle, will require more benevolence and reflection of mind than can be expected from unthinking bigotry." Again the same author, "I admire the wisdom and charity of this writer, in his prudent and generous concessions, though some may think he thereby gives his cause away; but I believe them so essential to the preservation of it, that what he writes is the very truth, and that without such concessions it will be impossible to maintain our ground against a keen adversary. All attempts to explain and defend our doctrine, which go upon the literal sense of the precept, or consider defensive war as a thing in itself wicked, how specious soever worked up or received by shallow judges, instead of honouring and serving, have injured a good cause by multiplying many if not needless absurdities and contradictions upon all such ill-judged attempts to state and clear the controversy." The same author, page 100: "The sword then which in tenderness of conscience thou canst not draw, may in another (whom for wise reasons it hath not pleased God to lead in the manner he hath done thee) become the outward providential means to preserve thee and others, as well as himself; upon which principle his arms may protect

thy person and property, and thy virtue and piety be a defence and blessing upon his arms." Again, p. 118: " King William the Third was a great warrior, and a great blessing to England, as he interposed for its deliverance in a trying time, when the liberty of the subject, under a specious solemnity of preserving it, was secretly undermined ; and the great duke of Marlborough, instead of being convinced of our principle, was a glorious instrument in a warlike way. From what has been laid down we may strongly conclude, that though a measure of divine grace, according to scripture, is given to every man, yet there may be an infinite diversity in degrees, and all things considered, it seems even impossible that it should by the giver, in every age and person, be designed to make precisely the same discoveries, and exalt to the same degrees of knowledge and perfection."

The above doctrine corresponds with a matter of fact, wherein the apostle Paul himself was nearly interested : It was at the time when upwards of forty of the Jews had " bound themselves under a curse, saying that they would neither eat nor drink till they had killed Paul." Acts 23d chap. from the 16th to the 24th v. And when Paul's sister's son heard of their lying in wait, he went and entered into the castle, and told Paul. Then Paul called one of the centurions unto him, and said, Bring this young man unto the chief captain : for he hath a certain thing to tell him. So he took him, and brought him to the chief captain, and said, Paul the prisoner called me unto him, and prayed me to bring this young man unto thee, who hath something to say unto thee. Then the chief captain took him by the hand, and went *with him* aside privately, and asked *him*, What is that thou hast to tell me ? And he said, The Jews have agreed to desire thee that thou wouldest bring down Paul to-morrow into the council, as though they would enquire somewhat of him more perfectly. But do not thou yield unto them : for there lie in wait for him of them more than forty men, which have bound themselves with an oath, that they will neither eat nor drink till they have killed him : and now are they ready, looking for a promise from thee. So the chief captain *then* let the young man depart, and charged *him*, See thou tell no man that thou hast shewed these things to me. And he called unto him two centurions, saying, Make ready two hundred soldiers to go to Cesarea, and horsemen threescore and ten, and spearmen two hundred, at the third hour of the night. And provide *them* beasts, that they may set Paul on, and bring *him* safe unto Felix the governor." It is evident here that the apostle's life was preserved through the interposition of the chief captain

captain ; and Paul hesitated not to put himself under his protection, although he had been previously assured of the Lord's particular providence and protection ; the Lord having stood by him, and said, " Be of good cheer, Paul, for as thou hast testified of me in Jerusalem, so must thou bear witness also at Rome."


Upon the whole, much more might be produced to shew that it is perfectly consistent with the doctrines of Christianity, and the practice of friends to acknowledge allegiance to the government that God, in the course of his providence, has thought proper should take place, and to conscientiously pay our proportion of Taxes for the support thereof ; but it is hoped the above is sufficient with every unprejudiced mind.

END OF THE ADDRESS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

SINCE the foregoing sheets were prepared for the press, there having fallen into my hands a Treatise, entitled, An essay concerning obedience to the supreme powers, and the duty of subjects in all revolutions ; it was first published in the year 1694, and written to justify the revolution in England, in 1688, against the doctrine of kings ruling by divine right, &c. and to shew the reciprocal duties of prince and people. The present revolution in America, being a case in many respects similar, and the arguments advanced in the aforesaid Treatise, appearing equally strong to justify obedience to the present American government, the following extracts are subjoined by way of appendix.

THE



THE INTRODUCTION.

THE design of this essay (which one wou'd think shou'd be no difficult task) is to persuade people to act for the good and prosperity of the community they are members of, and in which their own is included; and to convince 'em, that it is their duty as well as interest, to bear true faith and allegiance to the present government. Which design, that I may the better perform, 'twill be necessary to premise somewhat about government in general, and the grounds and measures of obedience to it; by which I hope I shall be able to shew, what is the duty of subjects, not only in the present juncture of affairs, but in all changes and revolutions.

A P P E N D I X,

Shewing the REASONABLENESS of OBEDIENCE to
the SUPREME POWERS, and the DUTY of SUB-
JECTS in all Revolutions.

C H A P. I.

Of Government, and the Origin of it.

GOVERNMENT, as 'tis usually defin'd, is *The care of other people's safety*; which consists in protecting and securing them from being destroy'd or oppress'd by one another, as well as by strangers; and redressing the grievances of those who are injur'd, and preventing the like for the future, by punishing offenders. In order to which, the governor must have a right to command the natural force of those who expect his protection, to enable him to put his laws and decrees in execution. Tho' without power government cannot consist, yet power and government are not one and the same thing; a man may be in the power of another, and yet not be govern'd by him: It is necessary that this power be made use of for protection, without which 'tis impossible to be protected; so that protection and government are the same thing: For where people are not protected, they are still in the state of nature, and without government.

It is government alone which gives the form, life and unity to a civil society or body politick, by which the several members have their mutual influence, sympathy and connection; so that to be a member of a civil society, and to be under government,

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is the same thing; and to be without government, and to be in the state of nature, are reciprocal, and predicated of one another. None can pretend to be, or claim any civil rights as a member of a society, without owning the actual government which makes it a society: and they who disown the government of the society they live in, do outlaw themselves, and virtually declare they are no members of it, because they have reduc'd themselves to a state of nature, by disowning there is among them a common judge, who has a right to decide their controversies, and redress their injuries, and in whose determinations they are oblig'd to acquiesce.

God, who is the author of every good thing, may be said in a more special manner to be so of government, because 'tis absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind; and, by the law of nature, which obliges mankind to act for their good, he has instituted it, and by his positive law since ratify'd and confirm'd it. Yet he did not constitute any particular form of government, but left mankind at liberty to dispose of themselves, as (when they instituted societies) they thought fit. God was so far from depriving any nation of this liberty, that when he was pleas'd to take upon him the office of a king over his own people the Jews, he first requir'd their consent; and a contract between God and the people (as is plain by the 19th of *Exodus*) was the foundation of the Theocracy. And since it is not by God's positive law, that one form of government, rather than another, is any where established, there remains no other way by which any government can be erected, or that one man can have a right to command over others, than by the law of nature, or by the consent of the parties concern'd. But there is no law of nature for any one form of government, so as to make the rest unlawful, or that one person rather than another shou'd have the sovereign administration of affairs: Nor can there be any one law of nature urg'd, why any particular person shou'd have a power over so many millions of different families, with no manner of relation or dependence one upon another, and who are by nature equal, being of the same rank, promiscuously born to the same advantages of nature, and to the use of the same common faculties. And therefore it remains, that government must be deriv'd from consent.

CH A P. II.

Of the Publick Good.

I Suppose I need not spend many words to shew the absolute necessity of government, for the good and well-being of mankind, or that it was for no other reason that men parted with their liberties

ties (for what else cou'd be an equivalent?) than the mutual defence and security they receive by government, which is the sole design and end of all laws, punishments and rewards. As this reason was at first the sole motive for submitting to particular persons, so 'tis the only reason still for continuing allegiance to them; and when this reason ceases, natural liberty returns, and then men are oblig'd, for the sake of their own safety and preservation, to pay allegiance where 'tis most for their interest and advantage.

Obedience is due to government, and not to the person who governs, but on the account and for the sake of it; otherwise people might be oblig'd to pay allegiance to a king after he had resign'd his regal office. *'Tis impossible for a king to lose his government, and not lose the allegiance of his subjects, because they are relatives*; and according to the nature of all relatives, one cannot subsist without the other.

Natural relations, as that between father and son, last as long as both parties live; but those which are artificial (if I may so term 'em) as between master and servant, king and subject, may be destroy'd during their lives: and when these relations cease, all obligations on both sides cease. The relation between sovereign and subjects is destroy'd, when the sovereign will no longer protect his people, and so freely withdraws from the government; or when he is depriv'd of the power of protecting 'em, and so is driven from his government; which, as to the people, (for whose sake government was instituted) has the same effect: and they equally lose that protection and defence, for the sake of which alone allegiance is paid, whether the sovereign will not or cannot any longer govern 'em, and is forc'd to leave his government in the hands of others, whereby those who were his subjects are as incapable of paying him allegiance, as he is to protect 'em; and the same force which justifies his leaving 'em, will equally justify their transferring their allegiance. And since no society is able to subsist without having justice administer'd, and enjoying those other blessings deriv'd from government; either they must by living without government become a prey to every one, or else there is a necessity of preserving themselves by paying allegiance to the new government.

For none can have a right inconsistent with the *publick good, which is the only fundamental law of all societies*; contrary to which no law (and consequently no legal right, which is built upon law) can be valid; to which, as to a center, each man's actions ought to tend, because the more universal any good is, the more it ought to be embrac'd: *And societies cou'd not subsist, but must necessarily fall*

fall into a state of war and confusion, if every man should prefer the advantage of any particular person before the good of the whole.

As every particular person's interest must yield to the general good of the society, so must that of a particular society to the more universal good of all societies ; and no principles can be true, (however they may serve a particular turn) which, if generally practised, would be against the good of all societies. But nothing can be more destructive and pernicious to all human societies, than those principles which assert that allegiance must be only paid to him who has a legal title ; because it must oblige vast numbers in all revolutions to be destroyed for the sake of a single person, rather than submit to another who is in the same station, and by whose power they might be governed and protected.

Can it be supposed, that when men submitted to government, (because it was absolutely necessary for their preservation) they did it on such terms, as should oblige them in so many cases to run into those inconveniences which they desired to shun, rather than live peaceably under a government which actually protects them ?

Nothing can justify such principles, unless the *misery* and *destruction*, not the *preservation* of human societies, be the *supreme law* ; or that it is a sin to act for the general good of a society, and a duty in the people to expose themselves to certain destruction, rather than act for their own good in a matter solely instituted for their benefit.

A man may be obliged to suffer rather than act against his duty ; but that he should be obliged to suffer rather than do his duty, in promoting the general good of the nation, is a strange paradox. If it be a duty to act for the public good, and the general interest of a society, and if the more universal the good be, the more it ought to be sought for ; then the means necessary to this duty, or end, must be as necessary as the end itself, because the end prescribes the means.

The paying obedience to those in possession, is a doctrine which tends so much to the interest of human societies, and of all the particular members thereof, that even they who oppose it, did they consult their own happiness, must wish it were true : And what greater argument can there be of the truth of it, than that it is so conducive to the good of mankind ?

And that common objection, or rather reflection, That it is interest makes these tenets, which require obedience to the pre-

sent government, so universally embraced, (however uncharitably designed) is so far from destroying the credit of them, that it is a demonstration of their truth; because they are for the good of particulars, of which the public is made up.

C H A P. III.

Of the Obligation of Human Laws.

ALL writers allow, that the leagues and contracts which princes make with one another, do oblige them no longer than they are in possession of their kingdoms; because the sole reasons of making these leagues were upon the power each kingdom had to afford mutual assistance and benefit to one another. And if this be a constant practice with kings, that their treaties oblige them no longer than while each king has possession of his kingdom; why will they not allow the same reason to hold for subjects, that they should be free from all obligations to princes, when they no longer receive any protection from them? Seeing that was the only ground and sole cause of their paying allegiance; and in truth they cannot be any longer obliged, than the reason for obliging them holds. For why should people be obliged, when there is no reason they should be so? No laws can bind any longer, than the reason for enacting them holds good; and when the sole reason which made them laws ceases, the laws themselves must so too: much more must any particular law be null and void, when not only the reason of keeping it ceases, but the keeping it thwarts the general intent of all laws, which is the happiness of the societies, to which all laws are but means: and there is no reason that the means should oblige, when the end for whose sake the means were ordained cannot be obtained by those means, much less when they become destructive of the sole end for which they were ordained.

If there were a law that ships should sail on such a side of the channel, and the sole reason, whether express'd or not, were for avoiding the dangerous sands on the other side; should the sands chance to be removed to the safe side of the channel, the pilot would be so far from being bound because of that law, to run his ship on the sands, that he would break the law if he kept to the letter of it, and would observe it by going contrary to the letter. So again, if a law, which required obedience to one particular person, should happen to be destructive of the public good, and of fatal consequence to the community, the letter of
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the law would oblige no more in one case than in the other ; nay, the reason of not observing the last would be stronger on account of the disproportion of the number : But the true meaning and intent of the law would in one case as well as the other oblige people to act contrary to the letter of it ; and they would be as much bound to pay obedience, where it is for the public good, as in the other case the ship would be to sail on the safe side of the channel.

CHAP. IV.

Objections answered.

Objct. **T**HOUGH *the good of the society be supposed the grand ultimate law, yet these principles, which require obedience to the possessor, cannot be true, because they are against the peace and happiness of nations, by encouraging rebellion against all princes, in obliging people to pay the same allegiance, even to those who unjustly depose them.*

Ans. These principles are so far from being destructive to the peace and quiet of nations, or encouraging rebellion against their governors, that they require obedience to all in possession, upon pain of damnation ; but if neither the fear of eternal punishment in the next life, nor the severest which can be inflicted upon them in this, can secure people from rebelling, I must confess, I know nothing that can. It is the duty of all subjects to do their utmost to defend the government ; that is only a just return, and what is due for its protecting and defending them : But if by the chance of war, or any other way, it should lose the power of protecting them, they are not obliged to have their throats cut, rather than pay allegiance to that government, by whose favour and protection they subsist, and enjoy what they have. And that prince is very unreasonable, and acts against the rules of humanity as well as charity, who when able no longer to protect the people, would rather have them destroyed, than own that government which can.

Nothing can justify such an inhuman and barbarous opinion, unless it can be proved that men entered into societies barely for the sake and interest of a single person ; and that if his pleasure or profit require it, millions of lives must be indispensably sacrificed. This is to place men in a worse condition than beasts, if they are in conscience obliged to lose their lives to gratify the unlimited pride, ambition, revenge, or interest of a single person.

It is strange that any *Englishmen*, who are the freest nation in

the world, should think they are no other than the King's property : Though it is but reasonable that men who design to bring the most insupportable slavery on themselves, should be qualified for it by notions and principles so much below the dignity of human nature. While the contrary principles are so far from being any ways prejudicial to mankind ; that it is they alone which in all revolutions can secure human societies, and make governments easy and safe both to kings and subjects, by putting an end to those otherwise endless disputes of titles. And princes may without tears or jealousies mind the public good, because it secures them who are in possession against all pretences.

The most that can be objected is, That a prince who has once lost his dominions, may by these principles chance to lose the hopes of ever recovering them again.

A prince unjustly expelled, ought to acquiesce, if he has no way of recovering his kingdom but by disturbing the peace and quiet of a nation ; he ought not to make use of such unlawful means for the recovery of his kingdom : and certainly others can have no reason to act against the good of the community for his interest, when he himself is obliged not to act.

The interest of a prince is only more sacred than another's, when that of the public is involved in it ; but when that is no longer concerned in his actions, he ceases to be the public person, and is upon equal terms with other private men, and ought as well as any other to acquiesce, rather than disturb the quiet of a nation. And there is then the same reason for not endeavouring to restore him, as there was at first for not turning him out.

All the ill consequences which can happen in this case are, That the less hopes princes have of being restored by such unlawful means, the more careful (it is hoped) they will be in governing the commonwealth, and more afraid of arbitrary and illegal practices.

Object. If all persons, how unjustly soever they get a crown, have the same right to the obedience of the people, to wit their consent, then there can be no such thing as an usurper.

Ans. He who without any just cause destroys the right which any prince has to the allegiance of his subjects, by making him incapable to protect them, and protects them himself, may be called an usurper : Though the people by the former prince's losing his power to protect them, are reduced to the state of nature, and by consequence free from any allegiance ; and may lawfully, or rather are obliged (every one else being out of capacity

capacity to protect them) to consent to be governed by him who has the power to protect them; who being so chosen, has the only right a king can have, the consent of the people, who are as much obliged to obey him, as they are any king whatever. The former king is so far then from being their legal king, that he is none at all, nor has any manner of right to their allegiance. It is true, the usurper having done him an injury, ought to make him satisfaction, and (if he can without any damage to the public) to place him in that condition he was in before he made him incapable to protect the people; who then, for the sake of protection which they receive from him, are obliged to pay him obedience. The having a right to be restored by the usurper, is the only right a prince unjustly deprived of his regal office can pretend to: And when I speak of his legal right, I mean only this by it. Among the *Jews*, though none could have a legal right except one of their own nation, because they were obliged by God himself, to chuse a king from among their own brethren, and God after ward entailed the crown on the posterity of *David*; yet when these were disabled to protect the people, by their being in the power of strangers, it was so far from being a crime, that it was their duty (notwithstanding the divine legal right any of their brethren could pretend to) to pay allegiance to them, though for the most part they were usurpers, having no just cause to conquer them.

C H A P. V.

Of Possession.

ALL writers, I think, allow, that after a possession of a long continuance (tho' they extremely differ how much time is necessary) a right accrues to the possessor, tho' there are some of the right line still in being. If it be unjust to pay the first possessor obedience, I don't see how a long possession can alter the case. A continuance in an injustice may make the injustice greater, but not alter the nature of things, and make the greatest wrong to be right: Though all things are done in time, yet time itself operates nothing.

This mistake, like many others, is occasion'd by the parallel men draw between private persons (who are ty'd up by laws enacted by the supreme powers) and the supreme powers themselves. By the laws of most nations, if private men neglect to make a legal demand of their rights in a certain time appointed, they lose them, and a right accrues to the possessor; but this depends on a law

law enacted by the supreme powers, who have a right to dispose of private estates, as they judge best for the publick good, whose laws can oblige only their own subjects. But what authority have the subjects, or the possessor, to dispose of the legal prince's rights? Besides, it might justly be imputed to a private man's own neglect, if, when the law is open, he does not recover his right: It may well be presum'd he has relinquish'd it. But that can't be said of a prince, who has no court of justice to appeal to, or any other likely way to recover his right; yet by bearing the arms and title, and by other ways, still asserts his right.

How numerous are the instances of princes possess'd of territories belonging to others, and who have been so for a great many years? Yet none dare affirm, the subjects who pay 'em allegiance, are, and have been all along traitors. To give but one instance among hundreds: The kings of *England* have a right to the kingdom of *France*, and have constantly claim'd it by causing themselves to be stil'd kings of *France*, and by bearing the arms of that crown; yet none will condemn the *French* as traitors, who have all along paid allegiance to the *French* kings. But if the kings of *England*, by tract of time, lost their right to the obedience of the *French*, and before that time 'twas treason for those of that nation to pay allegiance to the *French* kings, I shou'd be glad to know what month, or year, it ceas'd to be treason; for 'tis a thing of mighty consequence to know how long 'tis treason to obey a king in possession, and when it becomes treason not to obey him. In short, if a king can have a right to a country, and it be no crime in those of that country not to pay him allegiance, it demonstrates that allegiance is not annex'd to the title, but is due to the person who protects 'em.

Object. *Tho' time does not give a right, yet the acts, or the no acts, that is, the omission of some, may in time amount to a resignation of the right of the legal prince to the usurpers.*

Ans^w. I grant a man's mind may be express'd by acts as well as words; yet 'twou'd be very hard to condemn all those of treason who have paid allegiance to the possessors, before they had sufficient grounds to believe, the legal prince or his heirs had by their acts (if such acts cou'd destroy the right of the next of kin) resign'd their and their legal successors right to the usurper. In how few cases is there reason for such presumption? If till then all people shou'd be oblig'd to be destroy'd rather than pay allegiance, what a destruction wou'd it make in the world? Wou'd it not in most cases expose, at least the good and conscientious, to certain ruin?

And

And others cou'd not preserve themselves without a sin, the reward of which is damnation.

Long possession is not at all necessary to justify the people's obedience; for that very moment the people receive protection and defence from the new powers, they ought to pay 'em the same allegiance as if they had been in possession of the government a thousand years. The less time a nation has been settled, the more need it has of rest and peace, and the more dangerous wou'd any violent revolution be.

C H A P. VI.

Of Protection.

IF any wou'd not be thought enemies to the society, but part of it, ought they not to act equally with the rest for the peace and quiet of it, and submit to the head, that rules and governs it? How can they pretend to be members of the society, and consequently claim any civil rights by being so, without owning the actual government which makes 'em so? Do they not, by disowning it, renounce the benefit of the laws (which only can be put in execution by the government) and outlaw themselves? How can they have any more right to the protection of the government, if they outlaw themselves, than if the government, by putting 'em out of its protection, had outlaw'd 'em? So that 'tis wholly by the favour of the government (for they have no true pretence to 'em) that they enjoy any legal rights. If they think they shou'd be severely dealt with, did not the government protect 'em, why do they not what is necessary to enable the government to protect 'em? If they will the consequence, the protection of the government, ought they not to will the antecedent, all that is necessary to it? And if it be lawful to desire and to receive the advantages which flow from government (which I suppose no Jacobite will be so hardy as to deny) why must not the means necessary to obtain these advantages, be so too?

How can they who are willing to be protected by any person, be unwilling (except they desire contradictions) that he shou'd have a power to govern 'em, since without such a power he can't protect 'em? And they who are willing to receive a universal protection, are presum'd to be willing to pay all obedience necessary for that end; which is as universal as the protection they expect. 'Tis evident, that he who is willing to receive a universal protection from a government, is willing that the government shou'd have a coercive power over all others, to restrain 'em from injuring

juror him; and that it shou'd have sufficient authority to do justice, and oblige all to pay obedience to the laws, when put in execution for his sake, because in it wholly consists his protection: And he who is for the government's having power over all other people on his account, ought to be willing it shou'd have the same over him, for the sake of others, except he'd be the only man in the nation without government; and is unwilling to do that himself, which he'd have all others (whatever their principles are) to do.

If the *nonjurors* desire to be protected, and do actually receive the protection of the government, (tho' at the same time they pretend 'tis against their consciences) 'tis manifest they own the government, and by their actions consent to submit to it: And what force can a protestation have against their own acts?

Do not all who go into any foreign princes dominions, during their stay, by receiving the protection of the government, own themselves subject to it (except ambassadors, over whom sovereigns have agreed to suspend the exercise of their right) and are they not oblig'd, equally with the natives, to pay allegiance, and alike guilty of treason, and so try'd, if they attempt any thing against it? And upon this head, all private attempts upon a prince in his own country, have been abhor'd by all nations: and they who design'd any thing of this nature, have not been treated as just enemies, tho' in time of war; because 'tis presum'd, they enter as subjects into the dominions of that prince who protects 'em.

By examining what 'tis which gives government a right to the obedience of men, who are by nature free, 'twill the better appear what right the present government has to the allegiance of those it protects.

The reason usually given, why people are oblig'd to obey any particular government, is (no prince being ridiculous enough to pretend a right, as the first-born in a direct line from *Adam* or *Noah*) because 'twas the intent of those who first form'd the society, that such persons and their successors (if they made the government hereditary) shou'd have a right to govern the nation for ever. But how cou'd they, whose authority with their being ceas'd so long since, oblige the consciences of those who were not then in being? Or how cou'd any acts or compacts of their ancestors take away the natural liberty of those who were born so many years after, and who have the same right to freedom as they had? Or how cou'd their compacts oblige those who are not descended from 'em, but come from other countries into the society; and make

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it a sin in them not to obey the present governors of any society, on whose authority alone and not on the founders of the society, depends the validity of all former laws, which can only bind, because 'tis the will of the present powers they shou'd? otherwise no laws cou'd be repeal'd if their very being did not depend upon the pleasure of the present supreme powers, who design they shall oblige, till they declare the contrary.

Every person, though born free, yet he is for the sake of his own safety obliged to part with his liberty, and put himself under the protection of government. Nor can he be secure in what he enjoys any other way. Nor can he have a right in a country (which is already possess'd) to any thing, but by owning the government of that country. And by pretending to the privileges the rest of the society enjoy, he has own'd himself a member of the society, and a subject of the government of it. And this is the only way that any (except by verbal promises) consent to become subject to a government.

Whatever society people chance to be members of, whether their native or any other, they are during their stay equally oblig'd, for the sake of the protection they receive, to pay allegiance to the governors of that society. 'Tis not material, whether they enjoy properties for their lives, years, weeks or days; the greatest part of the natives have no more properties, or enjoy no greater advantages by the government than foreigners, yet they are obliged to pay the same allegiance the rest of the society do.

Though they who reside in a foreign society are equally subject with the natives to the laws of it, and by opposing the government would be equally guilty of treason; yet if during their stay, any alteration happens in the government contrary to the laws, they never scruple to pay allegiance to him who gets possession of the government, though his title be ever so illegal. I see no reason why they should not do the same in their first society, since whatever society they are in during their stay, they are equally obliged to obey the laws of it.

Are not these reasons as strong for paying allegiance to the present government? Can any man enjoy the privileges of the society, without being a member of it? Or can any one be a member of a society, without owning the power, or paying allegiance to it? Or is there any other head that rules and governs the members, than the present powers? Is it not by their authority, that the members of the society receive a universal protection, as to their lives, liberties and estates; under whose government they are, or else under none, but in the state of nature? And there is no reason or law, to oblige people to remain in a state so inconsistent

sistent with their happiness. And it would be injustice for any to remain in that state, because they would be their own judges in all the disputes they had with others, who were willing to refer their differences to a standing impartial judge. After this, what pretence can any member of the society have of refusing to pay their allegiance to a power, whom they have all along by their actions owned, and by whom they have been secured from groaning under the worst of slaveries, which had been to them the more intolerable, because of the great liberty and freedom they before enjoyed? So that all the reasons which can well be imagined to oblige people firmly and entirely to any human authority, do conspire to tie them up in the strongest bonds of allegiance and fidelity to the present government.

C H A P. VII.

Of Oaths of Fidelity.

PERHAPS it will be said, *Though upon supposition, there is no reason why people should pay allegiance any longer than they are protected, yet if they have otherwise tied themselves by their oaths, they are in conscience obliged by those oaths.* But I answer:

Such oaths, if ever they were imposed, would be so far from binding, that they would be null upon the account of the sinfulness of them, as being directly against the good of human society. In all promises and oaths concerning things not moral, this tacit condition is always included, of their not being, or upon alteration of the circumstances, becoming contrary to the public good: and this is without all doubt to be observed about government, because it was instituted for no other reason than the public good.

Oaths do not alter the nature of allegiance, or make it due where it was not before; or any ways extend it, but only add a new tie to pay that allegiance which is due on the account of protection. He who lives under a government, though he has not sworn to it, owes it the same allegiance as he who has; and if he should deny his allegiance to it, would be equally guilty of treason, tho' not of perjury. 'Tis evident by the universal practice of mankind, that no subjects ever thought themselves oblig'd by their oaths of fidelity, which governments have constantly impos'd on 'em, when they ceas'd to be protected by 'em. The legislative power, especially where the people have a share in it, are presum'd to recede as little as possible from natural equity, and to design, by imposing such oaths, the good and preservation of the society; whose interest it is, that they who have the public administration of affairs shou'd not be disturb'd. But 'tis not at all material whether this or that
man,

man, provided they are well manag'd, has the direction of 'em : Nor can it without the greatest absurdity be suppos'd, that such numbers of men as societies are compos'd of, who are by nature equal, shou'd oblige themselves by the most solemn ties to become most miserable, by living without protection ; nay, to lose even their lives rather than own the government which can protect 'em, for no other reason than barely an extraordinary fondness to one of their number, to give him not the necessaries or real conveniences of life, but only an office (for government is no other) which is but an imaginary happiness : For if government were a real happiness to the persons who possess it, several upon their parting with it wou'd not have found themselves happier than before. That people shou'd be true to those who have the administration of civil affairs, is all which oaths of fidelity require ; and 'tis evident by the words of it, that the late oath of allegiance required no more ; and to extend it further than the power in possession, is not reconcilable with the reason, end, and design of paying obedience, which is the peace and happiness of the society, and which can never be maintain'd, if people may, for the sake of a single person, disturb 'em who have the administration of their common affairs : and 'twou'd require impossibilities, because a private person is incapable of paying allegiance to a king when out of possession of the government.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Proofs of Scripture concerning Obedience to those who actually administer Government.

CHRIST in the directions he gave, *Matt. 23*, to his disciples, and to the multitude, about their behaviour to the Scribes and Pharisees, requires obedience to be paid 'em only on the account of possession : saying, *The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses's seat, all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do.* And he gives no other reason for this great obedience in doing and observing whatever they command, than because they sat in *Moses's* seat ; that is, were possess'd of *Moses's* authority, who in the Theocracy was the chief magistrate, Not that the Scribes and Pharisees had so great a power as *Moses* ; but as far as they did enjoy his seat, throne and authority, so far they were to be obeyed : They were then the greatest, as well as chiefest part of the grand *Sanhedrin*, which in all causes where the *Romans* had left the *Jews* to their liberty, had the supreme power both in civil and ecclesiastical matters. (There were not in the *Jewish* republic two distinct independent powers, one for civil, another for ecclesiastical causes.) If the people were then oblig'd to pay

so great obedience, barely on account of possession, why may not the same direction serve for a standing rule to the multitude in all times? And not only to the inferiors, but even to the supreme magistrate himself, Christ requires obedience on no other account than that of possession. If *Cæsar* be in possession of the empire, as it did appear by his coining of money, and stamping his image upon it, that being a mark of sovereignty and empire, but not of any legal title to it; then *Cæsar* is to have tribute and all other parts of allegiance paid him.

And St. *Paul* in express terms requires obedience to the powers which be, and declares there is no power but what is from God. The Jews being influenc'd by the Priests and Pharisees, and oblig'd by their law to place no stranger over 'em, scrupled to pay obedience to the *Roman* emperors, because they were strangers, and not capable of a legal right; not considering that the law oblig'd 'em only when it was in their own choice, and not when they were under the power of the *Romans*, to whom for the sake of protection they were obliged to pay obedience. St. *Paul* therefore, to take away these scruples, assures 'em all powers are from God: But had he only meant legal powers, since only Jews were capable of being such, he had confirm'd 'em in their error. But the reason why he obliges men to submit, will demonstrate that all actual rulers are meant, and only they, because they alone are a terror to evil works, and a praise to the good; none but the actual ruler is a minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil, or a minister of God for good. What can more fully demonstrate that the reason of obedience is for the benefits men receive by government? And what makes the crime of resisting 'em so great, is, that men oppose those by whom they receive so many advantages: It is, because they have the power of the sword (which includes all manner of punishment) by which they secure and protect their subjects from all manner of injury and violence from ill men. And being ministers of God for good, includes all the good they receive both to their persons and properties: for which cause you pay tribute also, for they are God's ministers, continually attending upon this very thing. 'Tis their dispensing these advantages to mankind, that makes 'em God's ministers and God's ordinance; the scripture affirming those things which are necessary for the good of mankind to come from God, as plowing and sowing, *Isa.* 28, 23--29. If it once be known, as the discovery can't be difficult, who 'tis that bears the sword, who administers justice, who rewards, and who punishes; and the apostle's word may be taken, subjection is not only due to him for wrath, but for conscience sake. And the same apostle exhorts,

exhorts, *That prayers be made for kings, and all in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty.* These reasons can only concern those who have actual power and authority, by whose protection they who live under 'em may lead such lives; and if it be our duty to pray that we may lead such lives, it must be our duty to enable them who have authority over us, to secure us in the enjoyment of a peaceable and quiet life.

And St. *Peter* for the same reason requires people to submit to the supreme magistrate, whom he calls *the ordinance of man*; so that 'tis plain, that God by approving this human ordinance, approves it as human, and requires obedience to it for the same reasons that men at first instituted it. And 'tis the power governors have to do good, which makes 'em to be not only God's ordinance, and God's ministers, but even Gods: for since they are not Gods by nature (tho' by some peoples way of arguing one would suppose they thought 'em such, or at least beings in themselves superior to the rest of mankind) it must be for the protection they afford that they are term'd so; who when they no longer protect the people, cease to be a human ordinance, and then too they cease to be a divine one. And the same reason which obliges people to submit to 'em, when they act for the good of the society, as much obliges people to oppose 'em, if they design to ruin and destroy 'em. It can't well be suppos'd, that God, who has oblig'd mankind to preserve their lives, and consequently to use the means necessary for that end, shou'd require people to suffer themselves to be destroy'd, only to gratify the lust or barbarity of a single person, or a few, who are by nature but their equals, and only above 'em by being in an office which they erected only for their convenience.

Object. St. Paul makes no manner of exception, but declares, *Whoever resists shall receive damnation.*

Answer. As the apostle requires obedience to parents in all things, and to masters, husbands, pastors, without mentioning any exceptions, so here he declares (which was sufficient for his purpose) that all people ought to obey the supreme powers, without mentioning this exception: which necessarily flows from the nature, end and design of government, and even from those reasons he gives for obedience.

It can't be presum'd that Christ authorised his apostles to make slaves of mankind, by giving the emperors a new power, who before by no law of God or nature had such a power over people's lives. All the power the *Roman* government had, was immediately from the people, who, as 'tis plain in history, by their mutual consent, erected that commonwealth: and what power the emperors had,

had, was given them too by the people, who by the *Lex Regia* confer'd it upon them.

All that can be deduced from scripture is, that obedience is due to those who protect the people, and nothing can be plainer than those texts which require it: By which plain and ignorant people may know their duty as well as the learned and wise. 'Twou'd have been inconsistent with the goodness of God to require obedience on the greatest penalties, and yet leave it so uncertain, as the *Jacobitish* principles would render it, to whom obedience is to be paid. What can be more uncertain than generally titles are? And are there not innumerable intricate difficulties, about long possession, presumed consent, a just cause for a total conquest, &c. If about these points the learned so extremely differ, as any one may perceive who examines what authors have writ upon it, who give good reasons for destroying one another's hypothesis, but none for confirming their own, which are not liable to equal exceptions, What means or possibility have almost all mankind, the unlearned and common people, of knowing their duty?

The primitive Christians all along complied with the revolutions of the empire; and whoever was in possession of it, without examining his title, they paid him allegiance, and thought him invested with God's authority: And as the *Goths* and *Vandals* and other barbarous nations on the one hand, and the *Saracens*, *Turks* and *Persians* on the other, without any just cause, overturned the *Roman* empire, the Christians were so far from disputing their titles, or refusing to transfer their allegiance to them, that they never scrupled to own their government. If these Pharisaical notions had been then believed or practised, those nations would have extirpated all the professors of Christianity as enemies to government and order, instead of being converted to their religion, as most of the northern nations were. Nor do the Christians who now live under the dominions of the infidels vary from this primitive practice, or scruple to transfer their allegiance to any who gets possession of the sacred office of governing, though the legal prince be still alive. Did not the *Jews*, though commanded by a divine law to take a king from among their brethren, and God himself had intail'd the crown on the posterity of *David*, practise the same as they fell under the power of the four great empires? And did they not submit to *Alexander*, without endeavouring to oppose him, when *Darius*, to whom they had sworn obedience, could no longer protect them.

I shall add only one instance more, and that shall be of *David*, who

who thought it not unlawful, when *Saul* design'd to take away his life, to transfer his allegiance, and fly to *Achish*, king of *Gath*, for protection, who made him keeper of his head, or captain of his guard: and whilst he was under his protection, he thought it his duty to pay all manner of allegiance to him: and (tho' contrary to his interest, and the hopes he had of being king after *Saul's* death) even to join with the uncircumcis'd to invade his own country, and fight against the *Lord's anointed*, his late king and father in-law, and, as appears by 1 Sam. 29: 8 he was much grieved, and humbly expostulates with the king, for not permitting him to attend him in the battle: *But what have I done? or what hast thou found in thy servant, so long as I have been with thee until this day, that I may not go and fight against the enemies of my lord the king?* *Saul* by designing to destroy *David*, had freed him from the allegiance he ow'd him; for he who designs to destroy a person, can't have a mind to govern that person; and if he will not govern him, he is free from his government, and at liberty to pay his allegiance where he thinks best. And if *David* expected from the king of *Gath* a universal protection from all his enemies, he ought to pay the king a universal obedience.

If a private person be freed from the government which designs to destroy him, the argument will hold as strong in behalf of a nation designed to be destroyed; and whoever attempts it, not only renounces the government of the nation, but puts himself in a state of war, and declares he is an utter enemy to them, who are as much oblig'd to resist him, as they are any other enemy.

Upon this head the *Jews*, in the time of the *Maccabees*, took up arms against their legal king *Antiochus* (whom they all along acknowledged as such, and who was successor to *Alexander*, who had the same right to their obedience as the *Persians* or *Assyrians* had) who was resolved to extirpate them, if they would not turn idolators. And 'tis manifest that God, by the miraculous assistance he gave them, (for what they did must be imputed to more than human force) did approve of their design. And the same reasons will justify any nation for opposing that prince who endeavours, upon a religious or any other account, to destroy them.

By what has been said, I hope 'tis plain, that by the positive law of God, by the law of right reason, by the law of nations, the universal practice of mankind, and the express law of the land, obedience is due to that power who actually governs the people: which right I think has been sufficiently demonstrated by those who have writ on that subject, at least to lawyers, and men who are competent judges in such points; of which a great many can
judge

judge no better, than of mathematical demonstrations, which are nevertheless demonstrations. But none can be mistaken who they are that actually govern the nation; and if obedience for that reason be due to them, other inquiries are needless.

To conclude, I hope I have demonstrated, That 'tis the duty of all people to bear true faith and allegiance to the present government, by reasons and arguments which are as firm as government itself, and which will endure as long as that, because built upon the same foundation, *The good of societies*; and which may serve for directions in all changes and revolutions, as well as for the justification of that happy one, which (by the blessing of God on his Majesty King William's heroick endeavours) preserves us in the enjoyment of all our happiness, both spiritual and temporal.

THE END.

N. B. The observations and quotations, which are found in this pamphlet, from and inclusive of the word "And," in the antepenult. line in page 25, to the end of the Address, were added by a Friend of the Author's, who was entrusted with the publication while he was in the country, with a discretionary power to add whatsoever he thought necessary.

